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The Good, the Bad, and the Disparate
ANALYZING FEDERAL SENTENCING IN THE
BORDER DISTRICTS, 1996-2008
INTRODUCTION
The escalating violence along the United States’ border
with Mexico could be likened to the days of the “Old West”:
grenades rolling into saloons, bullets fired into city halls,
violent assassinations.1 Unlike the days of the “Old West,”
however, constitutional protections now take the place of hired
guns. Rather than vigilante justice meted out by the luck of the
draw, federal courts provide offenders charged along the border
with the promise of certainty and fairness.
Offenders in the federal districts along the border need
not fear the arbitrary possibility of death from a heavy trigger
finger—the federal sentencing system was designed to provide
“certainty and fairness” by avoiding “unwarranted disparity
among offenders with similar characteristics convicted of
similar criminal conduct.”2 In theory, this uniform sentencing
system ensures that similar offenders are sentenced in similar
ways.3 However, given the intense pressures on law
enforcement and courts and the sometimes war-like state of
unrest in the border states, the risk seems real that the
certainty and fairness of the system might give way to chaos—
or at least disparity.
This note undertakes an empirical analysis of United
States Sentencing Guidelines data from the border districts from
1996-2008. This note’s analysis assumes that the border districts
are facing one overarching problem: heightened federal crime
1

On August 9, 2010, Texas Governor Rick Perry gave President Barack
Obama a letter describing such incidents as examples of the “dire threat amassing on our
southern border” and asking for increased federal resources along the border. Letter from
Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (Aug. 9, 2010),
available at http://governor.state.tx.us/files/press-office/080910_PerryObamaletter.pdf.
2
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_
Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf.
3
See id.
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related to activities along the United States’ border with Mexico.
Operating on this assumption, this note analyzes two aspects of
border district sentencing—fast-track motions4 and substantial
assistance motions5—to determine whether the districts are
dealing with their unifying problem in the same ways. This
analysis focuses on these two particular sentencing motions
because of the way they relate to the border districts: substantial
assistance motions are used less frequently in the border
districts than in the rest of the federal districts,6 and fast-track
motions originated in the border districts as a mechanism for
prosecutors to deal with heavy caseloads.7
Part I of this note gives context for a discussion of the
border districts and their sentencing practices in the last
several years. Section A introduces the five federal districts
along the U.S.-Mexico border and describes the growth of their
dockets over the last twelve years. This section discusses the
reasons for this growth, namely the increased law enforcement
efforts on the border and increased volume of federal
immigration offenders charged in the five districts. Section B
explains changes to the sentencing systems in the five border
districts, including the development of fast-track programs and
changes in the applicability of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. Part I concludes by explaining the source of the
data used for this note’s analysis and defining key terms.
Parts II and III of this note each analyze an aspect of
border district sentencing to look for trends or disparities, and to
determine whether such trends or disparities are justified or
unjustified. Part II analyzes rates of fast-track motions in the
border districts in years 2005-2008—concluding that the border
districts are using fast-track motions at different rates—and
theorizes that this disparity can be attributed to differing
prosecutorial practices in the districts. Part III analyzes rates of
substantial assistance motions in the border districts in years
1996-2008 and reveals that the districts have converged around a
4

The term “fast-track motion” is used in this note to refer to motions
currently made under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) section 5k3.1
for a downward departure in a defendant’s sentence based on his agreement to
expedited and truncated proceedings. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the
development and use of these motions in the border districts.
5
The term “substantial assistance motion” is used in this note to refer to
motions made under U.S.S.G. section 5k1.1 for a downward departure in a defendant’s
sentence based on his cooperation with the government. See infra Part I.B.1 for a
discussion of these motions.
6
See infra Part III.A.
7
See infra Part I.B.1.
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trend of low rates of substantial assistance motions. Part III also
examines the possible reasons for this trend and theorizes that
there are correlations between rates of substantial assistance
motions and variables such as the citizenship of offenders on the
docket and the use of fast-track sentencing in the districts.
This note contributes to literature on sentencing
disparities in the national context8 by examining a group of
federal districts dealing with an overwhelming localized crime
problem—illegal immigration and drug activities along the
U.S.-Mexico border—in order to see whether the chaos of the
region has permeated the uniform federal sentencing scheme.
This note’s analysis shows that, while the border districts are
dealing with their unifying problem in similar ways in one
respect (decreasing rates of substantial assistance motions),
they are unjustifiably disparate in their use of fast-track
motions. This note concludes that these decreased rates of
substantial assistance motions and disparate use of fast-track
motions suggest that prosecutors in the border districts are
sacrificing goals of uniformity and thorough law enforcement in
favor of expedient processing.

8

Sentencing scholars have discussed many aspects of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. For a discussion of the history and policy strategies motivating
the creation of the Guidelines, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1988)
(explaining the purposes, creation, and key motivations behind the guidelines). For
criticisms of the Guidelines as allowing too much prosecutorial discretion or creating
unwarranted sentencing disparities, see Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for
Snitches, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 600-21 (1999) (explaining the difficulty in quantifying
the impact of differing prosecutorial policies on substantial assistance motions, the
most common form of downward departure under the federal sentencing guidelines,
and presenting the varying rates of substantial assistance sentencing over the federal
districts), and Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58
STAN. L. REV. 137 (2005) (discussing several sources of variation in sentencing under
the federal sentencing guidelines and whether or not they are justified). For examples
of other empirical analyses of sentencing, see Linda Drazga Maxfield & Keri
Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry: Is Federal Practice
Comparable Across Districts?, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (2002) [hereinafter
Maxfield & Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry] (an empirical
analysis of unlawful reentry sentences across offenders and districts); Linda Drazga
Maxfield & John H. Kramer, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN
EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 24 (1998) [hereinafter Maxfield, EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK], available at http://www.ussc.
gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf (explaining the origin and mechanics of section 5k1.1
“substantial assistance” motions); and Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges
Changed Their Sentencing Practices?: The Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Feeney
Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 24-35 (2005) (an empirical analysis
examining the impact of judicial discretion and other factors on sentences).
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OVERVIEW OF THE BORDER DISTRICTS AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING IN THE BORDER DISTRICTS

The federal district courts along the border between the
United States and Mexico are no strangers to policy shifts,
precedent upsets, and high-volume, fast-paced prosecutions. In
the mid-1990s, national attention and increased law
enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border led to an
“exploding volume” of immigration-related cases.9 As a result,
the federal district courts experienced not only an increase in
their dockets but also national pressure to continue disposition
of cases at expeditious rates.10 This Part gives an overview of
the events impacting sentencing in the border districts, both
within the region and nationally.
A.

Growth of the Border District Criminal Dockets, 1996-2008

There are five federal districts along the U.S.-Mexico
border: the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, the
Southern District of California, the Southern District of Texas,
and the Western District of Texas.11 The Southern District of
California and the District of New Mexico are in the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while Arizona is in the Tenth
Circuit, and the Texas districts are in the Fifth Circuit.12 Each
district has a United States Attorney assigned to prosecute
federal criminal offenses in the district.13
According
to
the
United
States
Sentencing
Commission’s published data, all five border districts
experienced a notable general increase in the percent of
immigration offenders14 comprising their total dockets between
9

Thomas E. Gorman, A History of Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT’G
REP. 311, 311 (2009).
10
Id.
11
Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United
States District Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/Circuit
Map.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
12
Id.
13
United States Attorneys’ Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/offices/mission.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010).
14
Data by offense type (i.e. “immigration offenders”) represents the Sentencing
Commission’s representation of the offender’s “primary offense category,” obtained from
the Judgment of Conviction Order. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 2008 app. A (2009) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK
APPENDIX], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/appendix_A.pdf. The
“primary offense category” is the offense code applicable to the conviction on the charge
carrying the highest statutory maximum sentence. Id. Information on “immigration
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1996 and 2008.15 The United States as a whole also experienced
an overall increase in federal immigration cases,16 due largely
to the increased volume of immigration offenders in the border
districts.17 This increase has been the subject of national
attention from high-level government officials and the press.18
offenders” represents offenders whose primary offense was “trafficking in U.S.
passports; trafficking in entry documents; failure to surrender naturalization
certificate; fraudulently acquiring entry documents; smuggling, etc.; unlawful alien;
fraudulently acquiring entry documents; and unlawfully entering U.S.” Id.
15
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS app. B (2009) [hereinafter 2008 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/SBTOC08.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2007
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2008) [hereinafter 2007
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/
SBTOC07.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS app. B (2007) [hereinafter 2006 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2006) [hereinafter 2005
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/
SBTOC05.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS app. B (2005) [hereinafter 2004 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/SBTOC04.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2004) [hereinafter 2003
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/
SBTOC03.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS app. B (2003) [hereinafter 2002 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/SBTOC02.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2002) [hereinafter 2001
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/
SBTOC01.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS app. B (2001) [hereinafter 2000 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/SBTOC00.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2000) [hereinafter 1999
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1999/
Sbtoc99.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS app. B (1999) [hereinafter 1998 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1998/Sbtoc98.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1997
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (1998) [hereinafter 1997
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1997/
sbtoc97.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS app. B (1997) [hereinafter 1996 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available
at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1996/sourcbk.htm; [collectively, hereinafter SENTENCING
COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008] (showing an increase over the years in the number of
immigration offenders in the districts in relation to total offenders sentenced in the
districts).
16
The percentage of immigration offenses of the national total rose steadily
from 11.6% in 1996 to 28% in 2008. See SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008,
supra note 15.
17
Gorman, supra note 9, at 311.
18
See, e.g., President William Clinton, Remarks on Immigration Policy (July
27, 1993), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n32_v4/ai_13263265
(beginning the outline of his new immigration policy by explaining that he was “especially
concerned about the growing problems of alien smuggling and international terrorists
hiding behind immigrant status, as well as the continuing flow of illegal immigrants
across American borders”); Jim Yardley, Expanded Border Policing Clogs the Courts and
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In fact, President Barack Obama recently signed a $600 million
bill to increase border surveillance and the number of federal
agents along the border.19
Of the five border districts, the District of New Mexico
and the Southern District of Texas experienced the sharpest
increases in federal immigration offenders. The percent of the
total docket composed of immigration offenders in the District of
New Mexico rose from 26% in 1996 to 70% in 2008,20 and the
Southern District of Texas similarly rose from 27% to 72%
immigration offenders.21 The other three districts similarly
experienced large increases in the percentage of immigration
offenders on their criminal dockets.22
Not all immigration offenders are charged in federal
court. Federal prosecutors have general discretion whether to
prosecute referrals from federal law enforcement agencies.23
Immigration offenses, which “rang[e] from a noncitizen seeking
to enter the country illegally, to a legal immigrant overstaying
a visa permit, to organized criminal efforts to produce
counterfeit social security cards,”24 not only violate federal
criminal law, but violate administrative regulations and
implicate civil law as well.25 Roughly 80% of immigration
matters are handled in administrative proceedings.26
Many of the immigration offenders in the border
districts are Mexican citizens crossing the border without legal

Jails, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2000, at A7 (discussing the increased law enforcement efforts
along the border and the consequent shortages in local and federal resources to deal with
the offenders).
19
Julia Preston, Obama Signs Border Bill to Increase Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A10.
20
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15.
21
Id.
22
The other three districts rose as follows: the District of Arizona from 33.5%
to 57.9%, the Southern District of California from 45.5% to 61.5%, and the Western
District of Texas from 32.3% to 47%. Id.
23
Dorie Apollonio et al., An Analysis of Federal Immigration Prosecutions 4,
prepared for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting,
Apr. 2-5, 2009 (Chicago, Ill.), available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_
apa_research_citation/3/6/1/2/0/pages361209/p361209-4.php. Prosecutorial discretion
on whether to prosecute immigration offenses is outside the scope of this note. This
note concerns disparities in sentencing resulting from practices undertaken only after
the decision to bring federal charges has been made.
24
Id. at 5-6.
25
Id. at 6 (discussing the fact that most immigration offenses used to be
administrative offenses until Congress expanded the scope of immigration law).
26
Surge in Immigration Prosecutions Continues, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 17, 2008), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/188.
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authorization to do so.27 Increased law enforcement efforts at
the border have caused increased use of “coyotes,” or
professional smugglers who collect a stiff fee to assist in illegal
border crossings.28 Drug trafficking across the border is another
common immigration-related offense.29 In fact, national
policymakers recognize drug trafficking across the U.S.-Mexico
border as a severe and persistent problem, leading to
escalating violence in both countries.30 Top officials in the
border states have declared states of emergency several times
in the last decade due to escalating violence relating to drug
cartel activities along the border.31
The percent rise in immigration cases came at the same
time as an increase in the size of the criminal dockets of each
district.32 In 1996, the District of New Mexico sentenced 613
criminal defendants, and in 2008 it sentenced almost 300033—
meaning that its criminal docket more than quadrupled. The
Western District of Texas nearly quadrupled the number of
defendants sentenced between 1996 and 2008, growing from
only 1912 criminal offenders sentenced in 1996 to 7233
sentenced in 2008.34
The growth of the border district criminal dockets was
primarily due to increased law enforcement activities along the
border, which led to increased immigration arrests and
prosecutions.35 In the 1990s, law enforcement agencies received
increased funding and federal lawmakers expanded the

27

Illegal Immigration from Mexico, U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT, http://www.
usimmigrationsupport.org/illegal_immigration_mexico.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
28
Id.
29
Spencer S. Hsu & Joby Warrick, U.S. Stepping Up Response to Mexican Drug
Violence, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032401155.html.
30
Id.
31
Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Law Causes Split for Border Governors, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/us/07
governors.html.
32
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15. Although the
four other border districts experienced overall growth between 1996 and 2008, the
Southern District of California alone experienced a period of decline in docket size
between 2002 and 2005. Id. The reasons for this decline not related to the disparities
discussed herein are outside the scope of this note. For a discussion of the low number of
prosecutions in several offense areas and the forced resignation of Carol Lam, the United
States Attorney for the Southern District of California, see Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking
the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 378-80 (2009).
33
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15.
34
Id.
35
Gorman, supra note 9, at 311.
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applicability of federal immigration offenses.36 The increase in
the size of the border districts’ criminal dockets came at the
same time as other significant changes in sentencing. The next
section discusses changes in sentencing policy that occurred in
the border districts and nationally.
B.

Changes in Border District Sentencing: Federal
Sentencing Guidelines and Fast-Track Programs

Although they are often discussed as a singular region,37
the border districts are governed by the same sentencing scheme
as the other eighty-nine districts in the federal judiciary: the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”).38 The
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States
Sentencing Commission, an independent agency within the
judicial branch, to devise and promulgate federal sentencing
guidelines.39 The Guidelines went into effect in 198740 and were
found by the Supreme Court to be a constitutional delegation of
Congressional authority to the judiciary.41
The Guidelines were designed to “provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing by avoiding
unwarranted disparity among offenders with similar
characteristics convicted of similar criminal conduct.”42 The
Guidelines provide a framework for calculating the sentencing
range for a defendant.43 First, each offense in the conviction or
plea correlates to a base-level point assignment.44 The baselevel point assignment can be increased or decreased based on
the breadth and severity of the criminal conduct, the
defendant’s criminal record, and certain heightening or
mitigating circumstances of the criminal conduct.45 The
Guidelines also provide for downward and upward departures
36

Id.
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 145-46; Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 24-35.
38
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
COMMISSION (2009) [hereinafter SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW], available at http://www.
ussc.gov/general/USSC_Overview_200906.pdf.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 2.
41
United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (finding that, although
the Sentencing Commission was an “unusual hybrid in structure and authority,” its
creation did not violate the non-delegation doctrine nor separation of powers).
42
SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 1.
43
Id. at 2-3.
44
Id.
45
Id.
37
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from the calculated sentencing range based on factors relating
to the defendant’s criminal proceedings.46 The final point
calculation corresponds to a range of months for the
defendant’s sentence.47
1. Substantial Assistance Departures and Fast-Track
Sentencing
The two types of downward departures examined in this
note—fast-track motions and substantial assistance motions—
are notable because of their relationship to the border districts:
fast-track motions originated in the border districts and are
considered mainly a border district phenomenon, and the
border districts generally employ a much lower rate of
substantial assistance motions than most of the other federal
districts.48 These two downward departures are based on
government motions to lower a defendant’s sentence due to
some benefit received by the government in the course of the
defendant’s proceedings: fast-track motions reflect the
government’s benefit from a defendant’s agreement to
expedited and truncated proceedings, and substantial
assistance motions reflect the government’s benefit from a
defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement investigations or
prosecutions of other individuals.
Substantial assistance motions are the older and more
widely-used of the two downward departures discussed in this
note.49 Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the
government can make a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5k1.150 for a
downward departure for “substantial assistance.”51 These
motions, also known as “5k1.1” motions, are motions where the
46

Id. at 3.
Id. As explained later in this Part, the final Guidelines range used to be
binding upon the sentencing court. Id. at 2. However, after United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), the Guidelines are merely advisory, rather than mandatory. Id.
48
See infra Part III.A.
49
Substantial assistance motions are motions within the United States
Sentencing Guidelines and can be used in any federal district. See Maxfield, EMPIRICAL
YARDSTICK, supra note 8, at 2. In contrast, fast-track motions can only be used in
certain districts experiencing high volumes of certain types of offenders. See infra note
61 and accompanying text.
50
United States Sentencing Guidelines [U.S.S.G.] § 5k1.1 (1994) (“Upon
motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an
offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.”).
51
See Maxfield, EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK, supra note 8, at 3-4 (explaining the
origin and mechanics of section 5k1.1 “substantial assistance” motions).
47
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government essentially “pays” a defendant for his cooperation in
a criminal investigation by requesting a reduction in his
sentence.52 The amount of cooperation necessary to receive such
a motion may vary among U.S. Attorney’s offices.53 The potential
for sentencing disparities due to differing use of substantial
assistance motions has been the subject of significant scholarly
debate since the creation of the Guidelines.54
Compared to substantial assistance motions, fast-track
motions are a recent and even more controversial phenomenon.
The rise in the number of immigration offenders and growth in
the overall dockets in the border districts in the mid-1990s caused
federal prosecutors to look for ways within the Guidelines to
process the ever-heavier caseloads.55 Prosecutors began asking for
shorter sentences for defendants who would agree to plead guilty
at an early stage in the criminal proceedings.56
At first these motions were made ad hoc.57 Prosecutors
in the Southern District of California began using an informal
program in 1994, asking for lower sentences in exchange for a
defendant’s agreement to a speedy disposition of his case.58
Although the early disposition program originated solely from
continued use by prosecutors and the acquiescence of the
district courts, the Ninth Circuit officially approved the
programs in 1995.59
Other districts developed similar programs, and the
federal circuit courts upheld the programs against constitutional
challenges brought under equal protection, due process, and the
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.60 Districts in other
52

Miriam H. Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
Bibas, supra note 8, at 151.
54
See, e.g., Maxfield, EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK, supra note 8, at 5 (examining
trends in substantial assistance departures in the first years of the guidelines); Bibas,
supra note 8, at 146-47 (arguing that substantial assistance motions are a source of
significant disparities).
55
Gorman, supra note 9, at 311-12.
56
Id. at 311.
57
Id.
58
Testimony of Judge Marilyn L. Huff, Southern District of California, to the
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Concerning Fast-Track or Early Disposition Programs 12 (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/hearings/9_23_03/Huff.pdf. Judge
Huff explained that the fast-track program mainly addressed reentry after deportation
offenders in the District. Judge Huff also listed shortage of resources to house pretrial
defendants, marshal shortages, and inability to meet vast interpreter needs. Id. at 2-3.
59
United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995).
60
See Gorman, supra note 9, at 312 (listing the cases upholding the
constitutionality of early fast-track programs). In United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,
633 (2002), the Supreme Court found that a defendant’s guilty plea taken without
being informed of a potential later right to impeachment information did not violate
53
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regions of the country currently use fast-track programs.61
However, the ad hoc “early disposition programs” originated in
the border districts and sentencing literature often refers to
them as a border district phenomenon.62
Fast-track programs gained official sanction in 2003.63
After reviewing sentencing reports, federal legislators worried
that judicial discretion to use speedy disposition to depart
below the Guidelines ranges had grown to unacceptable rates.64
To remedy the perceived problem, Congress added the Feeney
Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the PROTECT
Act).65 The PROTECT Act was an omnibus crime control act
which, among other things, created the AMBER Alert system
and made changes to the federal criminal code and United
States Sentencing Guidelines.66 The Feeney Amendment
required the Sentencing Commission to limit judicial discretion
in sentencing, including limits to downward departures under
the then-mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.67 By

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Ruiz court noted that fast-track dispositions
require defendants to waive the right to receive any information from the Government
on affirmative defenses to be used at trial, and that this practice is constitutional. Id.
In United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1995), the case where
the Ninth Circuit approved the early disposition practice of the Southern District of
California, the court noted that the program satisfied Eighth Amendment concerns
because the defendant’s sentence was not so “‘grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crime as to shock our sense of justice.’” (quoting United States v. Cupa-Guillen,
34 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1994)). Moreover, the Estrada-Plata court found due process
arguments against the fast-track sentence to be frivolous, because under the same logic
all mandatory minimums and sentencing enhancements would also violate due process.
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623. The Ninth Circuit has also ruled en banc that fast-track programs
do not violate equal protection. In United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc), the court emphasized the lack of any evidence of racial animosity
motivating the fast-track programs. Although the defendant argued that prosecutors
maintained the discretion not to “give” fast-track sentences to defendants of different
nationalities, the court admonished that defendant’s argument should “be made to the
executive, not the judicial, branch.” Id. at 977.
61
Memorandum from Craig Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Regarding Reauthorization of Early Disposition Programs (Feb. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter Morford Memo], reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 318, 330-32 (2009).
Districts in Florida, New York, Idaho, Kansas, Utah, Nebraska, Georgia, Oregon, Puerto
Rico, and Washington have been authorized for fast-track programs. Id. at 331-32.
62
See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 146-47 (referring to justifications of border
district fast-track programs, and arguing that they cause disparities between border
districts and districts in other regions).
63
Gorman, supra note 9, at 312.
64
Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 12-13.
65
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
66
Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 8-9.
67
Id.; see also Gorman, supra note 9, at 312.
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legitimizing the fast-track programs, legislators hoped to
control their use and impact.68
The Guidelines amended pursuant to the Feeney
Amendment provide that when a defendant has participated in
an expedited plea and sentencing program, the government will
make a motion for downward departure known as a “fast-track
motion,”69 or a “5k3.1 motion.”70 The Sentencing Commission
reports participation in fast-track programs by reporting the
number of cases in which the government made a 5k3.1 motion.71
The Commission data on fast-track departures includes
departures for all offense types authorized to have fast-track
programs—in the border districts, the offenses authorized for
fast-track programs are all immigration and drug offenses.72
After the Feeney Amendment became law, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated rules and reporting
criteria for the newly legitimized fast-track programs under the
Guidelines.73 Under the DOJ’s framework, federal prosecutors
have the option to move for a downward departure of a
specified number of levels in the Guidelines in exchange for a
defendant’s expedited plea.74 In addition to pleading to the
offense, a fast-track plea must contain the defendant’s
acknowledgement of conduct constituting the charged offense,
agreement not to file any Rule 12(b)(3) motions,75 agreement to
waive appeal, and agreement to waive the opportunity to
challenge the conviction by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C.
68

See Thomas E. Gorman, Note, Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity: Rereading
Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 479 [hereinafter
Gorman, Rereading Congressional Intent] (discussing the legislative history of the
Feeney Amendment and the stated goals of the legislators responsible for its passage).
69
Downward departures are a decrease in the calculated Guidelines
sentence, after the defendant’s Guidelines sentence range has been calculated from
his/her offense and criminal history. See supra Part I.B.
70
U.S.S.G. § 5k3.1 (“Upon motion of the Government, the court may depart
downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized
by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for the
district in which the court resides.”). This analysis refers to 5k3.1 motions as “fasttrack motions.”
71
SOURCEBOOK APPENDIX, supra note 14.
72
See supra Part I.B.
73
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Setting
Forth Justice Department’s Sentencing Policies (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft
Memo], reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 318 (2009).
74
Id. at 319-20.
75
Motions under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 12(b)(3) must
be made before trial. These motions include motions alleging a defect in instituting the
prosecution, alleging a defect in an indictment, or motions to suppress evidence. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3).
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§ 2255.76 Although U.S. Attorney’s offices employing the fasttrack programs may determine how many levels of departure a
fast-track plea merits, departures cannot be for more than four
levels.77
In the first official authorization of fast-track programs,
the DOJ authorized all five of the border districts to use fasttrack programs for the offenses of illegal entry after
deportation and transportation or harboring of illegal
immigrants.78 The District of Arizona was additionally
authorized to use fast-track motions for the offenses of
alien/baby smuggling79 and first-time petty marijuana offenses
along the border.80 Between 2003 and 2008, the DOJ
periodically reauthorized the districts for the same programs.81
In 2009, Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden
reminded districts that reapproval of fast-track programs
depends on “demonstrable results establishing that the
authorized early disposition program is permitting the
prosecution of a significantly larger number of defendants . . .
than would occur if the program was discontinued.”82 Ogden’s
memorandum underscores the original intent of fast-track
programs: to equip districts to handle more cases.83
2. Changes in the Applicability of the Guidelines
In addition to the development of new sentencing
practices within the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
changes between 2004 and 2008 in the applicability of the
76

Ashcroft Memo, supra note 73, at 319-20. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006), a
federal prisoner would normally be able to petition for habeas corpus relief by asking the
court that imposed the sentence to “vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.”
77
Ashcroft Memo, supra note 73, at 320.
78
Both of these offenses are considered “[i]mmigration” offenses.
Memorandum from James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S.
Attorneys on Authorization of Early Disposition Programs (Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter
Comey Memo], reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 322, 323 (2009).
79
Baby smuggling has cropped up in several of the border districts.
Smugglers bring babies born in other countries (usually Mexico) over the border to be
adopted in the U.S. Sentences Handed Down in Baby Smuggling Case, VISALAW.COM
(Apr. 4, 2000), http://www.visalaw.com/00apr4/18apr400.html.
80
Comey Memo, supra note 78.
81
Id.; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to U.S. Attorneys on Reauthorization of Early Disposition Programs (Mar. 19, 2007)
[hereinafter McNulty Memo], reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 325 (2009).
82
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to U.S. Attorneys on Authorization for Early Disposition Programs (Mar. 29,
2009), reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 337, 338 (2009).
83
Gorman, supra note 9, at 311.
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Guidelines impacted sentencing in all federal districts. In 2004,
the Supreme Court ruled in Blakely v. Washington84 that a
state determinate sentencing scheme allowing a judicial
finding to increase the maximum allowable sentence for a
defendant was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment’s
requirement of a jury trial.85 In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled
in United States v. Booker86 that the Sixth Amendment’s
requirement of a jury trial for any element of a crime
heightening
the
maximum
allowable
sentence
was
incompatible with mandatory application of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, and therefore the Guidelines must be
merely advisory, rather than mandatory.87
Changes to the applicability of the Guidelines impacted
the use of substantial assistance departures and fast-track
departures. Booker’s holding arguably “undid the Feeney
Amendment, [and] limited the power that inheres in
prosecutors in a regime of mandatory sentencing rules.”88 The
Feeney Amendment set forth rigid confines for judicial
departures, but the entire system became advisory under
Booker. The shift from prosecutorial power to judicial power
occurred because, rather than being limited to departures
when the government has motioned for them (under the
mandatory guidelines system), the advisory system allows
judges to give lower sentences without government motion.
Some sentencing scholars question whether defendants
still have an incentive to cooperate after Booker.89 Motions for
downward departure due to substantial assistance or
participation in a fast-track program remain on the books as an
important aspect of calculating a defendant’s Guidelines range
to assist the court in sentencing. However, unless the

84

542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004). Blakely’s holding came on the tail of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held
that the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement applies to any factors (other than prior
convictions) that increase the penalty for a crime beyond a statutory maximum. 530
U.S. at 476-77.
85
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313-14.
86
543 U.S. 220, 233-34 (2005).
87
Id.
88
Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise
of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1426 (2008).
89
Doug Berman, What of Substantial Assistance?, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y
(Jan. 13, 2005, 11:02 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/
2005/01/what_of_substan.html.
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defendant faces a statutory mandatory minimum,90 a
government motion is no longer a necessary element for a judge
to depart downward.
C.

Data Analysis: Methods and Key Terms

The United States Sentencing Commission publishes
sentencing data in the Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing
Statistics, which accompanies the Commission’s Annual Report
for each fiscal year.91 In 2004, the Sentencing Commission
issued the data in two separate forms: pre- and post-Blakely.92
In 2005, the Sentencing Commission again issued the data in
two separate forms: pre- and post-Booker.93 Rather than divide
each year into two data points for analysis, this note combines
the pre- and post-data for each year into one overall data figure
for the year by calculating a weighted average94 of the two sets.
Scholars have used several methods for analyzing
sentencing disparities and evaluating the reasons for them.95
This note analyzes two aspects of sentencing in the border
90

See Baer, supra note 52, at 2 n.3 (describing the implications of a
defendant’s conviction for an offense carrying a statutory minimum, and the inability
of a sentencing judge to depart downward without a government motion).
91
Each fiscal year represents the sentencing data for offenders sentenced
between October 1 and September 30 of the following year. 2008 SENTENCING COMM’N
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15, at introduction. The Sourcebooks are available online,
published by year, and contain appendices with sentencing data broken down by
district. Annual Reports & Statistical Sourcebooks, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011).
92
542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that a judicial finding increasing the
maximum allowable sentence for a crime violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial). The two data sets denoted sentencing data before and after the opinion.
93
543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that in order to be constitutional under the Sixth
Amendment, the United States Sentencing Guidelines must be advisory, not mandatory).
94
Calculating a weighted average ensures that “quantities being averaged [are
given] their proper degree of importance.” JOHN E. FREUND, MODERN ELEMENTARY
STATISTICS 54 (10th ed. 2001). For example, an analysis merely averaging the pre- and postBooker data sets would not take into account the different periods of time the two data sets
represent. Here, the weighted averages were calculated by multiplying each x (data point for
which a full year total needed to be calculated) by the proportion of the total data (x/the sum
of the pre-and post-data) it represented before figuring it into the average.
95
See, e.g., Michael A. Simons, Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity and
Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L. REV. 921 (2002) (analyzing district
disparities in use of substantial assistance motions in drug cases by looking at percent
of drug offenders receiving substantial assistance motions in “high cooperation”
districts and “low cooperation” districts, and comparing the respective proportions of
drug trafficking offenses within the districts’ total dockets); Schanzenbach, supra note
8, at 1 (Schanzenbach ran a detailed statistical analysis of departure rates between
1993 and 2001. He found that, though at first glance rates of cooperation increased
between 1993 and 2001, analysis controlling for variables such as characteristics of the
crime and offender reveals that the actual increase was minimal.).

882

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

districts—fast-track sentencing and substantial assistance
departures—in three steps. First, this note looks at the
sentencing data in the border districts and looks for patterns or
disparities among the districts in order to ascertain whether
the districts seem to be using the motions in similar ways.
Second, this note theorizes possible explanations for the
patterns or disparities, based on factors such as sentence
composition,96 prosecutorial practices, or the characteristics of
the offenders on the district dockets. This second step of
analysis will also examine connections between the rates of the
two motions in the individual districts.
Third, this note uses Professor Stephanos Bibas’s
framework for analyzing sentencing disparities to theorize
about whether the disparities seem justified or unjustified.
Under Bibas’s framework, a disparity is presumptively
justifiable if it “correlate[s] closely with temporary, localized
crime problems.”97 A sentencing disparity is unjustifiable if it is
“unrelated to local crime problems or . . . track[s] legally
irrelevant factors.”98 Bibas’s framework is based on the notion
that district-level disagreements about policy or value are
unjustified sources of disparity, while responses to special
problems within the districts are justified sources of disparity.99
Each district has different judges and courthouse
cultures, a different U.S. Attorney, and specialized local needs.
However, the border districts’ heavy immigration-related
criminal caseloads set them apart from the other federal
districts and unite them as a unique bloc within the federal
courts.100 This note’s analysis operates on the assumption that
the districts share a “local crime problem”: significant law
enforcement efforts on the border leading to a heavy volume of
immigration offenders on their criminal dockets. The next two
sections will look at whether the border districts are using
96

Scholars often use composition of offenses as a statistical factor to find
correlations between how pervasive an offense is on a district’s docket, and how that
corresponds (or does not correspond) to rates of downward departure motions or
sentencing practices. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 95, at 949 (“The volume of drug
cases in a particular district does not explain the variation . . . .”); Frank O. Bowman,
III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal
Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 487 (2002)
(describing these scholars’ previous analysis of changes in proportion of drug type
prosecuted in federal courts).
97
Bibas, supra note 8, at 141.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
See supra Part I.A.
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similar methods to deal with the heavy task of implementing
national policy goals in local federal courts.
II.

ANALYSIS OF FAST-TRACK SENTENCING, 2005-2008

According to sentencing scholar Doug Berman, fasttrack disparity is a persistent “hot-spot” in post-Booker
jurisprudence.101 The disparity Berman refers to, however,
stems from sentencing arguments that “defendants who are not
within so-called ‘fast-track’ districts should be eligible for
comparable early plea reductions” when their situations are
similar to defendants who would get the fast-track reductions
in districts using fast-track programs.102 This note reveals
another type of disparity: disparity in how frequently fast-track
districts are using fast-track motions in sentencing.
This Part analyzes fast-track sentencing for the years
2005-2008 by looking at the rates of fast-track motions103 in
each of the five districts. The first step in the analysis
identifies significant disparities among the border districts in
their use of fast-track motions. The second step in the analysis
discusses possible reasons for the disparities and adopts the
conclusion that differing prosecutorial practices, such as the
use of charge bargaining,104 are the most likely reason for the
disparities. This Part concludes that the disparate use of fasttrack sentencing prevents fast-track programs from achieving
the goals that originally justified their creation.

101

Doug Berman, The Persistent Problems with Fast-Track Disparity After Booker
and Kimbrough, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Feb. 11, 2009, 9:41 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.
com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2009/02/the-persistent-problems-with-fasttrack-disparityafter-booker-and-kimbrough.html.
102
Id.
103
For a discussion of the history of fast-track sentencing and the
requirements for a fast-track sentence, see supra Part I.B.1.
104
Charge bargaining, as discussed by sentencing scholars, is the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion to charge a lower crime in exchange for something given up by
the offender. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 146 n.30 (explaining different means for
prosecutors to exercise discretion in charging and sentencing in the fast-track context,
and citing to a study where charge bargaining led to higher processing of cases in a
district) (citing William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choice and the
Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 310-11 (1993)).
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Step 1: Disparate Use of Fast-Track Motions in the Five
Border Districts

The sentencing data on fast-track motions since 2005105
reveals substantial disparity among the districts in their use of
fast-track motions.106 To compare the districts’ use of fast-track
motions, this note compares the rates of fast-track motions in
each district: the percent of offenders—out of total offenders
sentenced—receiving a fast-track motion in each border district
in each year 2005-2008.107 Figure 1 shows the rate of fast-track
motions per year in each of the five border districts for the
years 2005-2008. In 2008, 5 out of 10 defendants in the District
of Arizona received a downward departure due to participation
in a fast-track program, compared to about 3 of 10 defendants
in the Southern District of California, 1 of 10 in the Districts of

105

The Sentencing Commission began reporting 5k3.1 (fast-track) motions in
the post-Booker data in 2005. See 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note
15. Before these reports, the Sentencing Commission reported “other government
downward departures.” See 2002 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15.
These other motions for 2004, after Congressional authorization of fast-track programs,
likely include 5k3.1 motions. Data reported before Congressional authorization also
likely includes downward departures due to ad hoc fast-track programs. However, since
these motions are reported within the general category of “other downward
departures,” this note does not incorporate the data for those years into analysis of
fast-track disparities.
106
Other scholars have recently discussed fast-track programs as both a
statistical factor and a policy factor in sentencing disparities. Most analysis of
disparities related to fast-track sentencing programs relates to disparities between
fast-track and non-fast-track districts. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 145-46; Abe
Cho, Lowering Sentences for Illegal Immigrants: Why Judges Should Have Discretion to
Vary from the Guidelines Based on Fast-Track Sentencing Disparities, 43 COLUM. J.L.
& SOC. PROBS. 447 (2010). However, this note will look for disparities within the five
border districts, all authorized for fast-track programs in similar offenses.
107
Although only the post-Booker sentencing data reports specifically on 5k3.1
departures (and the pre-Booker data does not), the percentages from the post-Booker
reporting are useful to represent the year 2005 figures for several reasons. First, the
pre-Booker reporting data is a smaller fraction of the year total data (it represents
October 1, 2004 to January 11, 2005). Second, the percent of 5k3.1 motions given in the
post-Booker period is, with the exception of Southern California, consistent with the
following year’s rates of 5k3.1 departures. Third, the category where 5k3.1 departures
were reported in the pre-Booker data, “Other Government Downward Departures,” is
very similar in size to the percent in the post-Booker data. 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15, at introduction. Moreover, 5k3.1 departures were the
primary kind of departures recorded in this category. Finally, and most importantly,
the decision in Booker did not directly change the ability of prosecutors to make 5k3.1
motions, and so should not directly impact the rate at which they were made. See id.
(discussing the reason for separating the 2005 data, and characterizing the most
significant change post-Booker as being that judges were instructed to merely consider
the statutory guidelines, rather than considering them mandatory). Therefore, the
post-Booker 2005 data used to indicate 2005 levels is a number useful for general
discussion of larger disparities.
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Percent Offenders Receiving
Fast-Track Motions

New Mexico and Southern Texas, and only 3 of 100 in the
Western District of Texas.108
Figure 1
Percentage of Total Sentences
Involving Fast-Track Motions Per Year
2005-2008
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Not only are there significant disparities between the
border districts in the use of fast-track motions, but also the
disparities likely cause significant variations in sentences of
similar offenders across districts. In 2002, Linda Drazga
Maxfield, former Acting Director of the Office of Policy Analysis
at the Sentencing Commission, undertook a detailed
examination of federal practices involving unlawful entry, the
most common federal immigration offense, across the five
border districts.109 Her analysis concluded that, even controlling
for differences in criminal history, unlawful reentry offenders
with prior aggravated felony convictions received disparate
sentences in the five districts in 1997.110 Maxfield identified
“differential charging and plea practices across districts” as the
source of the disparities.111
Although fast-track programs had not been officially
authorized at the time of Maxfield’s analysis, she noted their

108

The District of Arizona reported fast-track motions for more than 50% of
all sentenced cases in the district. The other districts all had rates at or below 40% for
each of the years. The Western District of Texas, the district with the lowest rate of
5k3.1 departures, had consistently less than 5% of defendants receiving 5k3.1 motions.
2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15.
109
Maxfield & Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry,
supra note 8, at 260.
110
Id. at 263-65.
111
Id.
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ad hoc existence and contribution to the disparities.112 Maxfield
found that all of the districts were granting downward
departures, of which 9 out of 10 required offenders to accept
voluntary deportation (and waive a formal deportation
hearing).113 However, the districts varied widely in how many of
these downward departures were being given—in the District
of Arizona downward departures were given to 97% of unlawful
entry offenders, while in the Southern District of California
they were given to only 14.2%.114
The use of fast-track motions after Maxfield’s study
underscores the impact of the local variation. In 2005, all five
border districts were authorized for fast-track programs for the
two most prosecuted immigration offenses (illegal reentry and
improper entry).115 However, as discussed above, the districts
had widely disparate use of the fast-track programs. Based on
the data, it appears that some of the border districts continued
to use the fast-track charge bargaining Maxfield noted, rather
than fast-track motions, to process the high volumes of
immigration offenders.
Interestingly, the disparities in use of fast-track motions
do not correspond to comparatively reduced sentences.
Although the District of Arizona had the highest rate of fasttrack motions (by far) in the years 2005-2008, it also had the
highest median immigration sentence of the border districts in
each of those same years.116 The Western District of Texas, the
district with the lowest rate of fast-track motions, had median
immigration sentences for the years 2005-2008 very close to the
average of the median immigration sentences over the five
districts.117 Although this is a small sample set, it is clear that
increased rates of fast-track motions do not necessarily cause
lower median immigration sentences, and decreased rates of
fast-track motions do not necessarily cause higher median
immigration sentences.
112

Id. at 263. Maxfield noted that downward departures were the most
common reason for the differences in sentence length, but did not alone explain the
sentencing patterns. Id.
113
Id. at 262-63.
114
Id. at 262.
115
See supra Parts I.B, II.B.
116
For the years 2005-2008, the District of Arizona had median immigration
sentences of 26, 26, 21, and 23, respectively. SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 20052008, supra note 15. The average median of the five districts for those years was 18, 18,
16, and 14, respectively. Id.
117
For the years 2005-2008, the Western District of Texas had median
immigration sentences of 18, 18, 18, and 10, respectively. Id.
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Although fast-track motions have only been officially
used and tracked for the last several years, the data available
shows a clear disparity in how the border districts use fasttrack motions. The next section will suggest and analyze
possible sources for the disparity.
B.

Step 2: Possible Sources of the Disparities

There are several possible reasons for the disparities in
rates of fast-track motions. A logical reason for the disparities
is the fact that certain districts are authorized for fast-track
programs in more offense categories than are other districts or
divisions. A second possibility is that some districts simply
process higher volumes of defendants who are eligible for fasttrack programs. Another reason is that charge bargaining—the
practice of prosecutors bargaining for pleas using variations in
what crime to charge in the first place, rather than what
sentence to ask for—plays a large role in some districts and a
lesser role (or no role) in others.
One reason for the differences in the use of fast-track
motions could be differences in the fast-track programs for
which each district received authorization. In order to use fasttrack departures, a district must be authorized for a fast-track
program for the charged offenses.118 The Justice Department
authorized the District of Arizona for two more fast-track
programs than the other districts, meaning that the District of
Arizona could use fast-track departures for two more offense
types than the other districts.119
However, the District of Arizona used more fast-track
departures than the other districts by a substantial margin.
Moreover, the District of Arizona was not authorized for “drug
offenses along the border,” an authorization received by the
Southern District of California, Western District of Texas (in
2004), and the Laredo Division of the Southern District of
Texas.120 Although differing authorization for fast-track
procedures could contribute to some variation among the five
districts, the wide disparity between the District of Arizona

118

See supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B. New Mexico was also authorized for drug backpacking.
Comey Memo, supra note 78.
120
Filing by the United States in United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp.
2d 943 (2005), reprinted in 21 FED. SENT. REP. 339, 339-40, 342-43, 347-48 (2009).
119
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(with consistent rates over 50%)121 and Western District of
Texas (with consistent rates under 10%)122 rates of fast-track
motions seems too substantial to be attributed fully to differing
district authorization.
A second reason for the disparity could be that higherrate districts simply process more fast-track-eligible
defendants. Illegal reentry, the offense for which fast-track is
“the norm,”123 is a frequent offense in each of the border
districts. Logically, comparing the proportion of illegal reentry
offenses on the dockets of the highest and lowest rate fast-track
motion districts should show correspondingly high or low
proportions of illegal reentry offenders, or significant levels of
fast-track offenses that explain the disparity.
In 2005, 53% of offenders in the District of Arizona
received fast-track departures, and only 4% did in the Western
District of Texas.124 In that same year, just under a quarter of
Arizona’s docket involved illegal reentry cases.125 Similarly, the
Western District of Texas’s docket was just under 24% illegal
reentry cases.126 In other words, each district had roughly the
same proportion of illegal reentry cases on its criminal docket,
but the districts had widely disparate rates of fast-track
motions. Therefore, the proportion of illegal reentry offenders
on the districts’ dockets does not account for the disparate use
of fast-track motions.
The explanation for the disparity that seems most in
line with the evidence is differing practices or policies employed
by the respective U.S. Attorney’s offices in the border districts.
Maxfield theorized that much of the disparity she found in
121

See supra Figure 1.
Id.
123
Gorman, supra note 9, at 314.
124
2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15.
125
According to Sentencing Commission data, in 2005, 50.3% of Arizona’s
docket was immigration offenders. 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note
15. According to TRAC, just under 50% of the immigration offenders Arizona processed
were illegal reentry offenders. Immigration Convictions by Lead Charge,
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/
findings/05/criminal/district/arizona/arizonaglaw05.html. Although the Sentencing
Commission and TRAC collect their data from different sources, the percents are useful
for highly generalized comparison.
126
According to Sentencing Commission data, in 2005, 43.9% of the Western
District of Texas’s docket was immigration offenders. 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15. Of the immigration offenders, TRAC data shows that just
under 60% were illegal reentry. Immigration Convictions by Lead Charge, supra note
125. Therefore, loosely calculated, approximately 26% of Texas West’s docket was
illegal reentry offenders.
122
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sentences stemmed from differing charge bargaining
practices.127 Under the mandatory regime, the Guidelines
themselves were, as Kate Stith observed, “powerful bargaining
chips for prosecutors.”128 Even without the mandatory
framework, prosecutors still have “broad charging discretion.”129
Charge bargaining is an example of one way in which different
prosecutors’ offices could collectively—through official or
unofficial office policy—use their discretion to employ differing
means to deal with the same fast-track eligible offenders.
The type of charge bargaining Maxfield noted is the
practice where the prosecutor allows the defendant to plead to
a lesser crime in exchange for the defendant’s early disposition
of the case. For example, a prosecutor might allow a defendant
to plead to reentry of an illegal alien130—carrying a fine and
two-year maximum imprisonment, or both, rather than reentry
of an illegal alien convicted of a crime or previously
deported131—carrying a fine and ten-year maximum. In a
hypothetical charge bargaining scenario, there is no need for a
motion to lower the sentence because the defendant has
pleaded to a lesser crime.132 Therefore, prosecutors in the
Western District of Texas could be using charge bargaining to
process offenders more quickly, but not be making fast-track
motions. Under this scenario, prosecutors in the District of
Arizona might hypothetically be more likely to charge the
higher offense, yet make a fast-track motion so that the
sentencing court makes a departure for early disposition.
The comparison between the Western District of Texas
and the District of Arizona reinforces the inference from the
districts’ disparate use of fast-track motions that districts
processing the same high proportion of fast-track eligible
offenders are not processing those offenders in the same way.
The comparison suggests that some districts might be achieving
the effects of a fast-track motion (an ultimately lowered
sentence) without actually making the fast-track motion.

127

Maxfield & Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry,
supra note 8, at 263-65.
128
Stith, supra note 88, at 1444.
129
Id. at 1423.
130
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2008).
131
Id. § 1326(b).
132
Charge bargaining essentially mimics the ad hoc programs of the mid1990s, Gorman, supra note 9, at 312-13, and is allowed by the Attorney General,
subject to several qualifications and restrictions. See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 74.
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In sum, differences in fast-track authorization and
volume of fast-track-eligible offenders may play a part in the
disparate use of fast-track motions in the border districts.
However, charge bargaining by prosecutors is a more likely
source of much of the disparity.
C.

Step 3: Different Districts, Unjustifiably Different Systems

Differing prosecutorial strategies for dealing with the
large numbers of immigration-related offenders could be
strategic decisions or merely “local culture”—habits that
developed over time into accepted practice. Professor Bibas
accepted—and even lauded—local practices developed as
tactical responses to local crime problems.133 He acknowledged,
for example, that “a sudden rash of shootings . . . may require a
swift and severe response.”134 Moreover, local law enforcement
agents and prosecutors may have local knowledge about how
some crimes are being committed.135
However, according to Bibas, local variations lacking
such particular justifications can carry significant costs.136
Indeed, unjustified variations “make the law seem arbitrary,
undercutting its perceived fairness and legitimacy.”137 Bibas
identifies disparities due to federal district policy
disagreements as unjustified and especially troubling because
of the federal system’s aim to “address national problems and
enforce them with one voice.”138 Bibas’ concern seems especially
pertinent to the border districts, where all five districts work to
implement national policy goals relating to one overarching
localized crime problem.
Congress created official fast-track programs in order to
limit unchecked discretion in the sentencing process.139 As
several scholars point out, the aim of the amendments officially
creating fast-track motions was to allow for closer tracking of
downward departures for purposes of monitoring both judicial
and prosecutorial discretion.140 A sentence resulting from a
133

Bibas, supra note 8, at 141.
Id. at 139.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 140.
139
See supra Part I.B.
140
See, e.g., Gorman, Rereading Congressional Intent, supra note 68, at 5-6;
Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 8-9.
134
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charge bargain is reflected in the sentencing data as a “within
Guidelines” sentence and the actual reasons for the lower
sentence go unreported,141 thus defeating the Congressional goal
of tracking (and monitoring) district sentencing practices
through the Sentencing Commission’s data collection.
Allowing the discretion of prosecutors, who decide
whether to “charge bargain” in each individual case, to go
unmonitored arguably does more damage than simply defeat
Congressional goals. If, as the data suggests, some districts are
using a reported method and some are using an unreported
method, efforts to track use of fast-track motions to note
disparities or changing trends are much less effective.
Therefore, prosecutorial plea bargain practices related to fasttrack programs go unmonitored.142 The disparity in use of fasttrack motions is troubling because it reveals that border
districts are likely using very different systems for sentencing
similar offenders.143
III.

ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES

Although fast-track programs may be a recent “hot-spot”
in sentencing, substantial assistance motions and the related
sentencing disparities are a much-discussed144 aspect of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines. This Part analyzes
substantial assistance departures in the border districts in
1996-2008. The first section analyzes the rates of substantial
141

The lack of reporting is due to the fact that a charge bargain, by its very
nature, occurs in the “administrative criminal process” between the prosecutor and the
offender, rather than in the courts. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity
in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1411-12 (2003). In a charge bargaining
scenario, negotiations are not only left out of relevant sentencing data, but are also
completely shielded from public or judicial review. See id. (discussing lack of
transparency in charge bargaining and its implications for the sound administration of
criminal justice).
142
Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2008) (“[T]here are currently no
effective legal checks in place to police the manner in which prosecutors exercise their
discretion to bring charges, to negotiate pleas, or to set their office policies.”).
143
The indication that districts using fast-track programs are using them
disparately is even more troubling in light of the alleged disparities between districts
using the program and districts that are not. Defendants in several districts have
alleged a constitutional violation because they were not offered participation in a fasttrack program. See Berman, supra note 101; Gorman, Rereading Congressional Intent,
supra note 74, at 2-3 (describing a circuit split on whether the lack of a fast-track
program and the related disparity in applicable sentence can be taken into account at a
defendant’s sentencing).
144
See Baer, supra note 52, at 7-8 (describing different themes of criticizing
cooperation within the United States Sentencing Guidelines).
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assistance departures and reveals that, while disparities
existed in the past, the border districts are currently using
substantial assistance departures at similarly low rates. The
second section identifies several explanations for the
sentencing patterns, including characteristics of immigration
offenses that make them less likely to involve substantial
assistance motions. The third section concludes that the
substantial assistance patterns indicate that the border
districts are dealing similarly with their shared experiences,
although they may be sacrificing cooperation in the process.
A.

Step 1: From Disparity to “Uniformity”

The Sentencing Commission data on substantial
assistance departures reflects the number of sentences where
the judge made a downward departure in sentencing after a
government substantial assistance motion.145 Nationally,
district-level data shows wide disparity in the number and
proportion of substantial assistance motions given to
defendants in the federal districts.146 These national disparities
have been the source of significant scholarly criticism.147
Although districts can also have disparate practices in the
extent of departure recommended within the substantial
assistance motions,148 this analysis concerns only the
percentage of total offenders receiving substantial assistance
motions—not possible disparities in the resulting sentences.
In recent years the border districts have converged
around a trend of substantial assistance rates notably lower
than the national rate. Although in the 1990s the border
districts used substantial assistance motions at disparate
rates, the districts have gradually converged around relatively
145

This type of departure is allowed only upon a government motion,
Maxfield, EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK, supra note 8, at 2 n.6, indicating that the defendant
has provided “assistance to authorities in the investigation of criminal activities.” Id. at
3. Therefore, the rate at which sentencing courts depart for substantial assistance is
essentially the same as the rate at which prosecutors make substantial assistance
motions. Whether or not to make a motion is a unilateral government decision, not
subject to judicial review except for constitutional violations. Id. Therefore, discussion
of whether a defendant “received” a substantial assistance motion refers to the fact
that the government made such a motion and the judge incorporated it into the
defendant’s sentence.
146
Simons, supra note 95, at 948.
147
Baer, supra note 52, at 7. In fact, these disparities have been used as
evidence of improper prosecutorial discretion, Simons, supra note 95, at 924, and as an
indication of improper congressional policy choices, Bibas, supra note 8, at 138.
148
Bibas, supra note 8, at 149-50.
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similar rates.149 Figure 2, plotting the rates of substantial
assistance in the border districts over the years 1996-2008,
illustrates this trend. The differing rates show that in 1996, 1
in 5 defendants in the Southern District of Texas received a
substantial assistance motion, but only 1 in 10 defendants
received such a motion in each of the districts of New Mexico,
Southern District of California, and Arizona.150 However, since
2004, all five border districts have had rates of substantial
assistance motions between roughly 3-10%.151 These recent
rates in the individual border districts are lower than the
national rates of substantial assistance motions, which
remained around 13-15% in the years 2004-2008.152

Percent of All Offenders Receiving Motions

Figure 2
Percentage of All Offenders Receiving Substantial
Assistance Motions in the Border Districts
1996-2008
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SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15.
Id.
151
Id. Although rates of substantial assistance departures were slightly more
disparate in 2004 than in 2005, the overall substantial assistance trends in the border
districts do not appear to have been impacted by the changes in applicability of the
federal sentencing guidelines. In 2004, the substantial assistance rates of the districts
ranged between 3.8% and 10.4%. 2004 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note
15. In 2005, they ranged from 3.3% to 7.7%. Id.
152
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15.
150
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Step 2: A Downward Uniform Trend

The low (and dropping) rates of substantial assistance in
the border districts correlate to high (and rising) numbers of
immigration cases on the district dockets. This correlation can
be explained in several ways. First, it can be explained by
characteristics of immigration offenders and of the immigration
offenses themselves. Second, it can be explained by immigration
offenders’ high rates of participation in fast-track programs.
Statistical analysis reveals a fairly strong correlation
between the number of immigration cases sentenced in a
district and the number of downward departures based on
substantial assistance motions. Figure 3 shows a linear
regression of the percentage immigration offenses on a
district’s docket per year, and the percentage of cases receiving
substantial assistance motions.153 Each data point on the
regression is a district in a given year. Figure 3 shows that,
generally speaking,154 as the percent of the docket composed of
immigration offenders increases (on the x axis), the percent of
offenders receiving substantial assistance motions (on the y
axis) goes down. Although this correlation does not prove
causation between the two occurrences, it shows that there is a
fairly strong relationship between how much of a district’s
docket is immigration crimes and how many substantial
assistance motions that district’s prosecutors make per year.155

153

This linear regression has a negative slope. This shows a “negative
correlation,” or a tendency for large values of y to go with small values of x, and small
values of y to go with high values of x. FREUND, supra note 94, at 501.
154
Typical linear regression analysis assumes that the independent variables
will be normally distributed, or sharing an error distribution around a mean point.
Testing the Assumptions of Linear Regression, DUKE.EDU, http://www.duke.edu/
~rnau/testing.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). In this case, the independent variables
are themselves proportions (percentages). Lack of normal distribution can compromise
the estimation of coefficients, such as the correlation coefficient discussed herein. Id.
However, because this analysis does not involve the calculation of a correlation
coefficient, but merely the illustration of a generalized correlation trend, this note’s
analysis proceeds without normally distributed independent variables.
155
Linear regression of the overall U.S. data 1996-2008 reveals a correlation
2
of R =0.9 between the percent immigration offenders of total U.S. offenders and the
percent of offenders receiving a substantial assistance motion, a very high statistical
correlation. In other words, as the proportion of immigration offenders in the United
States rose, the proportion of offenders receiving substantial assistance motions
declined. However, the use of only 12 data points (the 12 years) suggests that this
correlation is useful, but may overemphasize the correlation that would exist if all of
the district data points (each U.S. district by year) were included in the regression.
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Percentage of Offenders Receiving
Substantial Assistance Motions

Figure 3
Correlation Between Percentage Immigration Offenders
(of Total Offenders) and Percent of Offenders
Receiving Substantial Assistance Motions
in the Border Districts
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Close examination of data from one particular district,
the Southern District of Texas, supports this correlation. The
district had noticeably higher rates of substantial assistance
than the other districts in the years 1996-2002.156 However, the
steady decline in rate of substantial assistance motions in the
district over that period corresponds to a rise in the proportion
of immigration offenses on the district’s docket.157
There are several qualities of an immigration offense
that explain why defendants in immigration cases do not often
receive substantial assistance motions. Cooperation aids
prosecutors and law enforcement officials in the detection of
other crimes or co-conspirators in a defendant’s crime.158 Unlike
drug trafficking offenses, which “by their very nature, involve
chains of accomplices, associates, and co-conspirators,”159
immigration offenders may be less likely to have coconspirators to testify against.

156

SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15.
In 1996, the Southern District of Texas’s docket was 50% drug trafficking
cases, and, in 2002, declined to just under 40%. Id. By 2008, the proportion of drug
trafficking offenders on the district’s docket had decreased to 18%. Id. The decrease in
proportion of drug trafficking offenses is due to the increase in immigration offenses. In
1996, the district’s docket was 27% immigration offenders; by 2002 it was 42%. Id. This
proportion rose fairly steadily (evening out for the years 2005-2007 around 65%),
reaching 72% in 2008. Id.
158
Baer, supra note 52, at 12-15.
159
Simons, supra note 95, at 938.
157
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Another reason immigration offenders might not
cooperate is that prosecutors are generally without authority to
offer them temporary deportation immunity, even if they are
cooperating witnesses.160 Therefore, immigration offenders will
have little incentive to cooperate because they will potentially
gain little from any bargain. Moreover, knowing that this
restriction exists might potentially chill prosecutors from
pursuing potential cooperators in the first place.
Increased use of fast-track programs is another reason
for the decrease in substantial assistance motions in each
district. Use and official sanction of fast-track motions161
increased during the same period as the decline of substantial
assistance motions. Although the corresponding timeframe does
not definitively show causation, characteristics of fast-track
sentencing support the argument for at least some correlation
between the two trends. For example, fast-track deals usually
preclude substantial assistance cooperation because they rely on
“the premise that a defendant who promptly agrees to
participate in [fast-track sentencing] has saved the government
significant and scarce resources that can be used in prosecuting
other defendants.”162 Fast-track disposition is a somewhat
“truncated procedure,”163 resulting in fast wholesale processing of
cases, rather than case-by-case prosecutorial discretion.164
Although this does not summarily preclude the possibility of
substantial assistance, it would logically seem to make it less
likely that the prosecutor would have the time to engage in the
process of evaluating a defendant’s potential for substantial
assistance and taking a proffer.

160

28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (2007) (“The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(Service) shall not be bound . . . through plea agreements, cooperation agreements, or
other agreements with or for the benefit of alien defendants, witnesses, or informants,
or other aliens cooperating with the United States Government, except by the
authorization of the Commissioner of the Service or the Commissioner’s delegate.”); see
also Rachel Frankel, Note, Sharks and Minnows: Using Temporary Alien Deportation
Immunity to Catch the Big Fish, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 433 (2009). Although
Frankel argues that this regulation de-incentivizes cooperation by lawful permanent
residents charged with minor crimes, id. at 432, the illustration of her argument (and
many of her subsequent arguments) focuses on cooperation related to crimes other than
immigration crimes, id. at 431.
161
See supra Part I.A.
162
Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All
U.S. Attorneys on Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited Disposition
or “Fast Track” Prosecution Program in a District (Sept. 22, 2003).
163
Bibas, supra note 8, at 146.
164
Id.
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Step 3: Low Rates as a Justified Trend

Although the border district data shows converging
rates of substantial assistance departures and a correlation
between the rates of substantial assistance and the proportion
of immigration offenders on the district dockets, the dockets of
the border districts are not composed of the same proportions of
immigration cases. In theory, the correlation between
immigration offenders and lowered rates of substantial
assistance motions should suggest that a district with lower
rates of immigration offenders would have higher rates of
substantial assistance motions. However, because the districts
have different proportions of immigration cases on their
dockets, it is more likely the factors associated with
immigration offenders, such as citizenship of offenders and the
districts’ increasing caseloads, correlate most directly to the
decrease in substantial assistance rates.
For example, the Western District of Texas has a low
proportion of immigration cases on its docket in relation to the
other border districts, but has similar rates of substantial
assistance departures. In 2005, the Western District of Texas’s
docket was only 43% immigration offenders, and it gave 7.7% of
offenders a substantial assistance motion.165 The district had
the highest rate of substantial assistance in the five border
districts, but it could be argued that, given the relatively low
proportion of immigration offenses on its caseload,166 the
percent of substantial assistance motions should have been
higher. However, the district had a comparatively high
proportion of drug trafficking offenders on its docket—41%, as
compared to between 20-30% in the other border districts.167
Given that drug trafficking is usually a “high-cooperation
crime,” this difference suggests that the Western District of
Texas has a disproportionately infrequent use of substantial
assistance motions as compared to the other four districts.
However, as discussed above, the citizenship of offenders
on a district’s docket can have a great impact on the rates of
substantial assistance motions.168 Moreover, the decreased use of
165

2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15.
In 2005, New Mexico had a caseload of 63.5% immigration offenders, and
the Southern District of Texas had a caseload of 67.2%. The other two districts were
also above 50%. Id.
167
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15.
168
See supra Part III.B.
166
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substantial assistance motions came at roughly the same time
as the overall increase in each district’s criminal docket. Both
factors—non-citizenship of offenders and increased caseloads—
likely relate to the lowered rates in the districts.
This trend seems in line with the sort of response to
“localized
crime
problems”
Professor
Bibas
deems
presumptively justifiable.169 The fact that the districts are all
being influenced by the factors they are experiencing—large
volume of non-citizen offenders, immigration offenders,
increase in criminal defendants—indicates that this trend is
not based on district-level policy disagreements. In other
words, this downward trend does not implicate the unfettered
or arbitrary prosecutorial discretion Bibas condemns.170 This
trend does indicate, however, that prosecutors’ “self-interest in
disposing of cases quickly”171 may be causing the border districts
to make less frequent use of cooperators.
CONCLUSION
This note undertakes an admittedly generalized
analysis172 of the border districts’ sentencing practices.
However, the data reveals two very interesting general trends:
the districts are experiencing different rates of fast-track
motions and low rates of substantial assistance motions. The
rise of immigration offenders in the districts can be linked to
both of these trends: the sharp increase of immigration
offenders—leading to hefty increases in the overall dockets—
led the districts to adopt different mechanisms for processing
the high volumes of criminal defendants, and also led to overall
lowered rates of substantial assistance motions.
Fast-track programs are justified by supporters as
programs borne of the necessity to deal with increasing
volumes of immigration offenders. This note’s analyses reveal
this justification to be based on fact. As discussed in Part I.A.,

169

Bibas, supra note 8, at 141; see also supra Part I.C.
Bibas, supra note 8, at 151.
171
Id.
172
This note’s analyses did not control for other sentencing factors such as
criminal history, or offender characteristics, such as age, method of disposition, or race.
For a description of a process for analyzing downward departures by creating “dummy”
models to control for those variables, see Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 17-19; see also
Maxfield & Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry, supra note 8,
at 261-62 (controlling for Criminal History Category in analyzing border district
sentencing practices on unlawful entry immigration offenses).
170
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the border districts have growing dockets, largely due to
notable increases in the number and proportion of immigration
offenders. However, another way to look at the justification for
fast-track programs is one of priorities: border districts
processing a high volume of cases can boast of “high stats” and
perhaps assuage public outcry for increased border security.173
However, this note’s analysis suggests that focusing on highvolume processing may lead to less cooperation and disparate
fast-track practices. In other words, the border districts may be
“throwing the baby out with the bathwater”—that is, working
toward goals of high-volume, speedy dockets rather than
effective law enforcement or fair sentencing practices.
The sentencing data from the border districts hardly
shows disparities akin to vigilante justice meted out by sheriffs
or gunslingers. Although the districts are using some
sentencing mechanisms differently, they are united by the
effort to deal with the high volume of offenders on their
criminal dockets. However, examination of sentencing trends in
the border districts shows that the chaotic violence in the
border districts, reminiscent of the “Old West,” has played out
in federal sentences and should be a closely monitored aspect of
federal efforts in the border states.
Sarah C. White†

173

Apollonio et al., supra note 23, at 6.
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